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ELECTRONIC MAIL AND MICfilGAN'S PUBLIC 
DISCLOSURE LAWS: THE ARGUMENT FOR 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO GOVERNMENTAL 
ELECTRONIC MAIL 
Daniel F. Hunter* 
This Note explores the potential for citizens to request electronic 
mail (e-mail) records from government agencies using public 
disclosure laws, with emphasis on the Michigan Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). E-mail is a medium that has come to 
replace both telephone calls and paper documents for many pur-
poses. The applicability of public disclosure laws to e-mail, how-
ever, is less than clear. Telephone conversations by public employees 
for most purposes are confidential, while paper records created by 
those same employees can be requested under the FOIA. Thus, 
should public e-mail remain private and confidential or should it 
be subject to FOIA requests? 
Public access to e-mail, like public access to government records, 
would help promote the goal embodied in the disclosure laws of 
open government. Yet public disclosure of e-mail also could consid-
erably dampen the candor, informality, and ease of communication, 
which makes e-mail so popular and effective with employees of 
public agencies. This Note argues that an attempt to request e-mail 
messages most likely would succeed under the provisions of Michi-
gan's public disclosure laws. More importantly, this Note maintains 
that, with certain exceptions for faculty of public schools and for 
highly informal messages, e-mail created by public agencies should 
remain open to public scrutiny given the policies underlying the 
Freedom of Information Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
Electronic mail (e-mail) is now used by almost all of Michi-
gan's state agencies and universities to allow employees to 
communicate with each other and, often, with the general 
public. Some Michigan state employees are connected to 
* Article Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 29, 
1995. B.A. 1991, University of Michigan; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan Law 
School. An early draft of this Note, which has been substantially revised, was 
written in collaboration with Professor Kent Syverud under the auspices of the 
Michigan Law Revision Commission, an agency of the Michigan state legislature, 
and was published in 29 MICH. LAW REVISION COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1994). The 
opinions expressed in this Note, however, are solely those of the author. 
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hundreds of other state employees by large mainframe com-
puters, while others can send messages to only five or ten 
people on a Local Area Network (LAN). Still others can com-
municate through networks with millions of users of personal 
computers worldwide. Regardless of their size or scope, these 
electronic messages represent the cutting edge of today's 
workplace technology. E-mail has many advantages compared 
to traditional means of communication, including speed, ease· 
of access, and the ability to save and retrieve messages at the 
user's convenience. These advantages have led to an enormous 
increase in the use of e-mail by both the private and public 
sector. 1 · 
It is entirely unclear, however, what responsibilities ac-
company the advent of this new technology. Certain Michigan 
statutes and the Michigan Constitution require the government 
to conduct its business in the open. The most significarit 
statute in this regard is the Michigan Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA or Act) which requires that many government 
records be disclosed when requested by the public.2 Moreover, 
the Management and Budget Act requires that the government 
permanently preserve all writings which record the activities 
of the government.3 These statutes raise an important issue: 
To what extent are e-mail messages that are sent or received 
by state employees "records" which must be preserved and, if 
requested, disclosed to members of the public? Are e-mail 
messages subject to discovery requests submitted to state 
agencies and universities when they are parties to civil law-
suits? 
Public disclosure statutes like the FOIA and the Manage-
ment and Budget Act were written to protect the public's right 
to know what the government is doing, where it is spending 
money, and about whom it is keeping records.4 These statutes 
were written, however, when information traveled in basically 
two media: paper memoranda (letters) and telephone calls. In 
general, paper memoranda were considered public records, and 
telephone calls were considered private conversations. Today, 
e-mail has bridged those media. E-mail correspondence is like 
1. ANNE W. BRANSCHOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION 163 (1994). 
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.231-.246 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
3. Id. §§ 18.1284-.1292 (West 1994). 
4. See infra Part 11.A.1. 
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a telephone conversation in that most messages are short, 
casual, and can travel around the world in minutes. At the 
same time, e-mail messages are like written memoranda be-
cause they can be copied, edited, filed, and printed onto paper. 
E-mail is a medium that has come to replace both telephone 
calls and documents for many purposes. Michigan public 
disclosure laws, which historically have differentiated between 
telephone conversations and ,documents are probleµiatic when 
applied to a medium that straddles this line. Nevertheless, the 
applicability of public disclosure laws to electronic mail may 
determine how public employees communicate in the. future. 
Public access to e-mail, like public access to government 
records, would help to promote the goal of open government 
embodied in disclosure laws. Yet public disclosure of e-mail 
also could considerably dampen the candor, informality, and 
ease of communication which makes e-mail so popular and 
effective among employees of public agencies, as well as among 
administrators, faculty, and students at public universities and 
secondary schools in Michigan. · 
Part I of this Note describes e-mail and summarizes its 
unique characteristics that pose challenges to any program of 
public disclosure. Part II analyzes the existing statutes, con-
stitutional provisions, and court rules that are relevant to 
disclosure of public records. Part III argues that under current 
law, e-mail messages are likely to be considered both a "writ-
ing" and a "public record" within the scope of Michigan's 
Freedom of Information Act and its Management and Budget 
Act. This Note concludes that, in most circumstances, e-mail 
messages would be subject to disclosure upon request of a 
citizen unless a court excuses a particular message from 
disclosure under narrow and cumbersome exemptions. 
This Note recommends revision of one exemption to the FOIA 
to provide a safe harbor for the subset of electronic messages 
that most closely resemble the informal exchange of ideas and 
information that has traditionally occurred by telephone. In 
addition, an exception for university-centered e-mail may be 
needed so that students and researchers, individuals whose 
activities the state never intended to cover under the FOIA, do 
not have their e-mail opened to the public. In general, e-mail 
should be subject to public scrutiny in furtherance of the goals 
of FOIA, but these rules must be tempered to allow for the 
technical difficulties of storing and retrieving ma.ssive amounts 
of e-mail data and to allow for certain e-mail to remain private 
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until it. crosses the threshold between. a set of ideas and a 
public record. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC MAIL AND ITS USE IN 
MICHIGAN'S PUBLIC AGENCIES AND UNIVERSITIES 
"Faster than a speeding letter, cheaper than a phone call, 
electronic mail is the communication medium of the '90s."5 E-
mail is electronic mail automatically passed through computer 
networks, via modems over common carrier lines, or a combina-
tion ofboth.6 According to the Electronic Mail Association, the 
number of e-mail users is growing at twenty-five percent per 
year and currently stands between thirty to fifty million. 7 
A. The Parts of an E-mail Message 
Just as memoranda are composed of several parts, including 
a heading and a body, and just as telephone conversations 
include greetings, discussions, and closings, e-mail messages 
also have several components. Every electronic message must 
have an "address" which contains the information necessary 
to send a message from one computer to another anywhere in 
the world. 8 An e-mail message need not be sent just to another 
person; it can be sent to a computer archive, a list of people, 
or even a pocket pager.9 An e-mail address contains a local part 
and a host part; these parts are separated by an "@'' sign, 10 for 
example, danielhunter@umich.edu. Once one knows the ad-
dress of a person, typing a few keystrokes will send the mes-
sage to its intended recipient and even to multiple recipients. 
Because e-mail can be sent in many ways to many places and 
people, the legal challenge of opening e-mail to public scrutiny 
5. DAVID ANGELL & BRENT HESLOP, THE ELEMENTS OF E-MAIL STYLE 1 (1994). 
6. THE NEW HACKER'S DICTIONARY 142 (Eric S. Raymond ed., 1991). 
7. ANGELL & HESLOP, supra note 5, at 1. In 1980 there were an estimated 
430,000 electronic mailboxes, and by 1992 that number had grown to approximately 
19 million. Ernest A Kallman & Sanford Sherizen, Private Matters, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Nov. 23, 1992, at 85, 85. 
8. BRENDAN P. KEHOE, ZEN AND THE ART OF THE INTERNET 9 (1994). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 10. 
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is significantly greater than it may appear at first glance. For 
example, there may be only one written record of a university's 
position on a topic, yet there could exist thousands of e-mail 
messages on that same topic sent back and forth among 
university administrators. 
In addition to the "address," each message must have a 
"header" in order to be transferred to other computer systems. 11 
A header contains useful information not only for the systems 
and the users but also for the public, because the header 
reveals much more than a phone call record or a letter. For 
example, the header records precisely what time a message 
was received and viewed by the addressee. Thus, even though 
a message may be sent to many recipients, the header provides 
a crucial link to the record because it traces the route of every 
message. The header must remain attached to the memoran-
dum because an e-mail message without a header tells the 
public very little. 
B. Pathways of E-mail Messages 
To appreciate the technical difficulties associated with public 
access to e-mail records, it is necessary to understand the 
length of the path which every message must travel before it 
reaches the recipient. An e-mail message rarely is transmitted 
directly from one computer to another; instead, each message 
is sent to a "server" which is a central computer that provides 
a service to "client" computers.12 Servers are generally oper-
ated by private companies, such as Compuserve, Inc., or by 
non-profit entities, such as the University of Michigan. In 
order to send e-mail to other networks, a system needs a 
gateway to the Internet. 13 These gateways are computers that 
11. See id. at 10-12. 
12. TRACY LAQUEY, THE INTERNET COMPANION 102 (1993). 
13. Id. at 51. LaQuey writes: 
The Internet is a loose amalgam of thousands of computer networks reaching 
millions of people all over the world. Although its original purpose was to 
provide researchers with access to expensive hardware resources, the Internet 
has demonstrated such speed and effectiveness as a communications medium 
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have connections to networks and know how to translate the 
e-mail messages.14 Once a gateway is obtained and the proper 
address is found, e-mail can be sent anywhere in the world. 
C. E-mail Access and Disposal 
.. 
The last technical problem that bears on the public's access 
to e-mail is the disposal process. Disposal of e-mail is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, e-mail may exist long after a 
government official believes it has been deleted. This happens 
when someone else, or another server which handles the e-
mail, saves the message. On the other hand, e-mail can be 
deleted with the touch of a button. This may not have the same 
psychological impact on the disposer that the shredding of a 
document has on the person. Taken together, these two quali-
ties may balance out. Members of the public looking for govern-
ment e-mail may find an important message hidden away on 
another hard drive as often as they find that a crucial message 
was simply deleted. 
The storage and disposal of e-mail differs widely depending 
on what system controls the message. Just because a receiver 
deletes a message does not mean that it is destroyed. The 
system used by the sender often retains a copy of the message, 
and a duplicate of the message could also reside with another 
user. 15 That user could then forward the message to thousands 
of other users. A sender therefore should not assume that the 
receiver has deleted the message. Additionally, it is simple for 
the receiver to archive, print, or forward any message or part 
of any message. Printing e-mail to a local printer is a common 
and convenient way of saving messages for later reading, but 
it is also a way for others to stumble across personal e-mail. 
Universities often have different retention and disposal 
regulations. The University of Michigan, for example, has 
that it has transcended the original mission. Today it's being used by all sorts 
of people ... for a variety of purposes .... 
Id. at 1. 
14. Id. at 51. 
15. See ANGELL & HESLOP, supra note 5, at 6-7. Usually e-mail networks save 
messages simply for administrative purposes, such as the need to return a message 
if a person has sent it to an incorrect address. KEHOE, supra note 8, at 12-15. 
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established a procedure for the disposal of its electronic mail. 
In an article entitled Greater Security for Your Outdated E-
Mail on MTS, the university announced its policy of deleting 
messages at the end of every back-up cycle, which lasts twenty-
eight days. 16 The university warns that "[u]sers should keep in 
mind that history-chain and forwarded messages may be 
retrievable long after the original message has expired or been 
deleted."17 The policy of Western Michigan University, on the 
other hand, does not state explicitly when their files are 
deleted. Nevertheless, the official guidelines caution that "[i]t 
is generally not intended that electronic mail serve as a 
repository for records of permanence or lasting value and 
account holders are responsible for purging electronic mail 
messages older than one year."18 
II. MICHIGAN PUBLIC DISCLOSURE LAWS 
Currently there are numerous methods by which information 
about the Michigan State government is disclosed upon request 
by members of the public. This Note will focus on Michigan's 
Freedom of Information Act, 19 relevant sections of its Manage-
ment and Budget Act, 20 and certain discovery procedures under 
the Michigan Court Rules.21 Where it is analogous, reference 
will be made to federal law, including the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act,22 the Federal Records Act,23 and federal case 
law. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that federal law 
is particulady important when no Michigan case applies: 
16. Greater Security for Your Outdated E·Mail on MTS, INFO. TECH. DIG. NEWS-
LE'ITER (University of Michigan Information Technology Division, Ann Arbor, Mich.), 
Aug. 8, 1992, at 1 (stating that a deleted or expired message is retrievable after one 
hour and for up to 28 days). 
17. Id. 
18. Letter from Richard A. Wright, Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs, 
Western Michigan University, to Kent D. Syverud, Executive Secretary, Michigan Law 
Revision Commission (July l, 1994), reprinted in 29 MICH. LAW REVISION COMM'N 
ANN. REP. 97 app. 4c (1994). 
19. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.231-.246 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
20. Id. §§ 18.1284-.1292. 
21. MICH. CT. R. PRAC. 2.302, 2.310. 
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). 
23. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2909, 3101-3107, 3301-3324 (1988). Chapter 33 is some-
times referred to specifically as the Federal Records Disposal Act. 
984 University of MU:higan Journal of Law &form [VOL. 28:4 
Because there are no Michigan cases dealing with this 
issue, we look to the federal courts for guidance in deci-
phering the various sections and attendant judicial inter-
pretations, since the Federal· FOIA is so similar to the · 
Michigan FOIA~24 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President25 is particularly 
important because the federal government appears to have 
taken the lead in this decision and found that e-mail in certain 
circumstances may constitute a public record under federal 
law. 
A. The FOIA and Electronic Mail 
In applying the text of Michigan's FOIA to e-mail, the pri-
mary issues are whether e-mail is a "writing"26 under the 
FOIA; whether e-mail is a "public record"27 under the FOIA; 
and whether any exemptions to the FOIA apply generally to 
e-mail, most importantly the privacy exemption28 and the com-
munications within a public body exemption.29 Before ad-
dressing these and other issues, it is important to review both 
the purposes and the text of the FOIA. 
1. Purposes of the FOIA-The purpose of the Act must be 
considered when resolving ambiguities in the Act's definitions, 
including its definition of a public record. 30 The Act's preamble 
states that 
[i]t is the public policy of [the State of Michigan] that all 
persons ... are entitled to full and complete information 
regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of 
those who represent them as public officials and public 
employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be 
24. Hoffman v. Bay City Sch. Dist., 357 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) 
(citation omitted). 
25. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
26. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 15.232(e) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
27. See id. § 15.232(c). 
28. See id. § 15.243(1)(a) (West 1994). 
29. See id. § 15.243(1)(n). 
30. Walloon Lake Water Sys., Inc. v. Melrose Township, 415 N.W.2d 292, 294 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
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informed so that they may fully participate in the demo-
cratic process. 31 
In addition to this policy statement, Michigan courts have 
interpreted the purpose of the FOIA as being primarily a pro-
disclosure statute: 
The Legislature in the enactment of the Michigan FOIA 
followed closely, but abbreviated, the Federal Freedom of 
Information Act. The intent of both acts is to establish a 
philosophy of full disclosure by public agencies and to deter 
efforts of agency officials to prevent disclosure of mistakes 
and irregularities committed by them or the agency and to 
prevent needless denials of information.32 
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Walloon Lake Water 
Systems, Inc. u. Melrose Township interpreted the FOIA's 
status as a disclosure statute as meaning that "the FOIA does 
not require that information be recorded; it only gives a right 
of access to records in existence."33 In general, then, the FOIA 
"does not impose a duty upon a governmental official to pre-
pare or maintain a public record or writing independent from 
requirements imposed by other statutes."34 However, the court 
concluded that the purpose of disclosure also implies a duty to 
"preserve and maintain [a record requested through the FOIA) 
until access has been provided or a court executes an order 
finding the record to be exempt from disclosure."35 The Walloon 
Lake court explained its reasoning as follows: 
· [I)t cannot be seriously maintained that the Legislature did 
not contemplate the continued existence of the record 
subsequent to the request for disclosure and during the 
pendency of a suit filed under the FOIA. If public bodies 
were free to dispose of requested records during this time, 
31. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.231(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
32. Schinzel v. Wilkerson, 313 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (citations 
omitted); see also State Employees Ass'n v. Department of Management & Budget, 
404 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Mich. 1987) (noting that the Michigan Supreme Court has 
"consistently recognized that the FOIA ... is a disclosure statute"). 
33. Walloon Lake, 415 N.W.2d at 295. · 
34. Id. 
35. Id. (emphasis added). 
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a claimant's right to disclosure under the FOIA would not 
b_e adequately safeguarded. 36 
This ruling thus spells out a duty not to destroy records once 
they have been requested under the FOIA. It does not, how-
ever, require that a record be preserved ifthere is no pending 
FOIA request. 
The Federal FOIA also was designed as a pro-disclosure 
statute. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized 
that the "basic purpose [of the Federal FOIA] reflect[s] 'a gen-
eral philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is 
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.' "37 The 
Court held that the nine exceptions to the Federal FOIA "do 
not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the 
dominant objective of the Act."38 
When the Federal FOIA was signed into law in 1966, Presi-
dent Johnson said, "I signed this measure with a deep sense 
of pride that the United States is an open society in which the 
people's right to know is cherished and guarded."39 When 
issuing a new ·Executive Order governing classification and 
declassification of government information, President Nixon 
commented: 
Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that when 
information which properly belongs to the public is sys-
tematically withheld by those in power, the people soon 
become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of those 
who manage them, and-eventually-incapable of deter-
mining their own destinies.40 
When Senator Kennedy introduced the 197 4 revisions to the 
Federal FOIA, he emphasized that democracy succeeds only in 
a system where information flows freely: 
36. Id. 
37. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (quoting 
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965)); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 
80 (1973) ("Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access 
to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to 
create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly 
unwilling official hands."). 
38. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361. 
39. S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974). 
40. Id. 
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If the people of a democratic nation do not know what deci-
sions their government is making, do not know the basis 
on which those decisions are being made, then their rights 
as a free people may gradually slip away, silently stolen 
when decisions which affect their lives are made under the 
cover of secrecy. 41 
However, there are those who contend that these lofty ob-
jectives are undermined in practice.42 Compliance with the 
Michigan FOIA can be very expensive and burdensome for 
state agencies on tight budgets and with limited staff.43 Fur-
thermore, the FOIA can be used to obtain sensitive information 
about individuals for invidious purposes. For example, the 
University of Michigan has noted that "[u]niversities have 
experienced FOIA requests from male prisoners asking for the 
names of all female students, from former employees asking 
for the contents of ... files of current employees, from citizens 
asking for the names of all individuals who participate in 
specific communication [sic] or social groups" and from others 
whose requests tax the resources of the school "unnecessarily 
and perhaps inappropriately."44 
2. Relevant FOIA Provisions-The Michigan FOIA places 
the burden upon the public to request public records from the 
government. "Upon an oral or written request which describes 
the.public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find 
the public record, a person has a right to inspect, copy, or 
receive copies of a public record of a public body .... "45 A 
"public record" is defined as "a writing prepared, owned, used, 
in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the perfor-
mance of an official function, from the time it is created."46 
The definition of a "public body" for the purposes of the FOIA 
includes "[a] state officer, employee, agency, department, 
41. Id. 
42. See, e.g., Letter from Elsa K. Cole, General Counsel, The University of 
Michigan, to Kent D. Syverud, Executive Secretary, Michigan Law Revision Com-
mission (July 28, 1994), reprinted in 29 MICH. LAW REVISION COMM'N ANN. REP. 83 
app. 4a (1994) [hereinafter Cole Letter]. 
43. Id. at 88. 
44. Id. In order to protect their privacy, individuals and organizations have sued 
the government to prevent disclosure in what are called "reverse FOIA suits." See 
generally 2 BURT A. BRAVERMAN & FRANCES J. CHETWYND, INFORMATION LAW 659 
(1985). These suits more often are connected with confidential business information. 
Id. at 660. 
45. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.233(1) (West 1994). 
46. Id. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
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division, bureau, board, commission, council, authority, or 
other [executive] body," but it does not include "the governor 
or lieutenant governor, the executive office of the governor ... 
or employees thereof."47 The FOIA defines a "writing" as 
handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photo-
graphing, photocopying, and every other means of record-
ing, and includes letters, words, pictures, sounds, or 
symbols, or combinations thereof, and papers, maps, 
magnetic or paper tapes, photographic films or prints, 
microfilm, microfiche, magnetic or punched cards, discs, 
drums, or other means ofrecording or retaining meaningful 
content.48 
Twenty-one items may be exempt from disclosure under the 
Act.49 These exemptions include: information of a personal na-
ture where the disclosure would equal a "clearly unwarranted" 
intrusion into the individual's privacy;50 information compiled 
for law enforcement purposes;51 information covered by the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act;52 and communi-
cations between public bodies which are of "an advisory nature" 
and are "preliminary" to a final action. 53 
3. Issues in Applying the FOIA to E-mail-a. ls E-mail a 
"Writing" Under Section 15.232(e)?-Writings are defined so 
broadly under the FOIA that electronic mail would probably 
fit under the definition given in the Act.54 Because electronic 
messages are typed into a computer, the language specifying 
"typewriting''55 may apply. E-mail is usually written to a 
computer disk or a hard drive tape and, thus, may fall within 
the scope of "magnetic or punched cards, discs. "56 E-mail also 
may be printed on a printer, qualifying a message as a "print-
ing."57 It is possible to create an electronic message and to send 
47. Id. § 15.232(b). 
48. Id. § 15.232(e). 
49. See id. § 15.243(1). 
50. Id. § 15.243(1)(a). 
51. Id. § 15.243(1)(b). 
52. Id. § 15.243(1)(e). The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
relates to funding for educational institutions based on their education records review 
policies. 
53. Id. § 15.243(1)(n). 
54. See id. § 15.232(e). 
55. See id. 
56. See id. 
57. See id. 
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it to another computer without ever printing it or saving it on 
disk, but even this· message must reside in Random Access 
Memory (RAM) for at least a short while. Thus, such a message 
could fall under the statute's broad catch-all phrase, "other 
means of recording or retaining meaningful content."58 
Two authorities imply that the current Michigan FOIA 
applies to e-mail messages. First, in the 1982 case of 
Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, 59 the Michigan Su-
preme Court held that computer tapes containing the names, 
addresses, and other information about Michigan State Uni-
versity students were a "writing" under the FOIA. Chief 
Justice Fitzgerald's opinion stated that "the term 'writing' 
specifically includes a magnetic tape."60 There is no obvious 
reason not to extend that analysis to information contained in 
a computer's memory. Justice Ryan's opinion emphasized that 
the computer tape is a means of retaining meaningful content 
and, thus, a writing under the Act, an argument that applies 
with equal force to computer memory as well.61 
Second, the Office of the Attorney General opined in 1979 
that stenographers' notes and tape recording or dictaphone 
records of a municipal meeting were "records" under the 
FOIA.62 "Since the definition of'writing' ... includes symbols, 
magnetic tapes, or 'other means of recording or retaining mean-
ingful content,' stenographer's notes, tape recordings or dicta-
phone records of municipal meetings are public records under 
the Act and must be made available to the public."63 The 
Attorney General decided, however, that computer software 
owned by the State was not "writing" within the scope of the 
FOIA.64 The dilemma was that software was both "a set of 
instructions for carrying out prearranged operations" and also 
"stored on paper cards in the form of decks and on reels of 
magnetic tape."65 The Attorney General reasoned that 
58. See id. The FOIA does not define "meaningful content." 
59. 327 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. 1982). 
60. Id. at 785. The force of Kestenbaum is somewhat diluted, because it affirmed 
a lower court opinion by an equally divided vote. Nevertheless, the text of both of the 
Michigan Supreme Court opinions in Kestenbaum implies that a "writing" should be 
construed under the FOIA to include e-mail because the statute "defines a writing to 
include 'magnetic or paper tapes ... or other means of recording or retaining mean-
ingful content.' " Id. at 792 (Ryan, J., opinion for reversal). 
61. Id. at 801. 
62. 1979-1980 MICH. ATT'V GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 264. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 265. 
65. Id. 
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although the forms on which the software is recorded 
appear to meet the definition of a 'writing' as defined by 
section 2(e) of the Act, a distinction must be made between 
writing used to record information or ideas and an instruc-
tional form which is but an integral part of computer 
operation. 66 
These authorities suggest that electronic messages would 
probably be held to be "writings" within the definition of 
section 232(e). E-mail is not an "integral part of computer 
operation" but more like a form of writing used to "record 
information or ideas." Moreover, these decisions show that 
many different forms of electronic information have been held 
to be "writing" under the FOIA. 
The Federal FOIA does not hinge on the term "writing" but 
rather on the definition of a "record." Nevertheless, the federal 
authorities suggest that electronic communications have value 
as records, and even if the information is not a traditional 
writing, it should be saved for at least two reasons. First, 
federal case law has filled in the gap in the definition of 
records. The court in Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration 61 noted that "[a]lthough it is clear that Congress was 
aware of problems that could arise in the application of the 
FOIA to computer-stored records, the Act itself makes no 
distinction between records maintained in manual and com-
puter storage systems."68 Second, in drafting revisions to the 
FOIA, Congress implied that computerized documents were re-
cords when it explained that the term "search" would include 
both conventional searches and computer data base searches. 69 
This reasoning persuaded the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia that "computer-stored records, 
whether stored in the central processing unit, on magnetic tape 
or in some other form, are still 'records' for purposes of 
FOIA."70 The court added that "[t]he type of storage system in 
which the agency has chosen to maintain its records cannot 
diminish the duties imposed by the FOIA."71 
66. Id. 
67. 678 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
68. Id. at 321. 
69. See S. REP. No. 854, supra note 39, at 12. These revisions concerned retrieval 
problems the government was encountering, among other difficulties. 
70. Yeager, 678 F.2d at 321. 
71. Id. 
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Thus, under federal law, e-mail might not qualify as a "re-
cord" for some reasons, but it would not be excluded as a record 
because it is written, stored, or managed by a computer. 
b. Is E-mail a "Public Record" Under Michigan FOIA Section 
15.232(c)?-In order to qualify as a record under the Michigan 
FOIA, a writing must pass a two-pronged test. It must be 
(1) "prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by 
a public body" (2) for the purpose of "performance of an official 
function, from the time it is created."72 In other words, even if 
e-mail is considered a writing for the purposes of the FOIA, not 
all e-mail will qualify as public record. For example, e-mail 
discussing lunch plans might not pass the test, whereas e-mail 
discussing budget revisions for the state probably would. · 
The first prong of this test is broad. All six justices in 
Kestenbaum agreed that computer tapes containing the Michi-
gan State University student directory passed the first prong 
of the test. 73 At first glance, e-mail also would seem to satisfy 
the first prong because state agencies.may use it every day to 
perform a wide variety of tasks. E-mail, however, is rather 
ephemeral: E-mail is a two-way communication, and it need 
not be "prepared" by a public agency to find its way onto the 
agency's tape drive. Any system connected to the Internet could 
receive messages prepared by anyone in the world. Although 
many e-mail messages are not meant to be "retained," mes-
sages may pass through a university's large mainframe and 
arrive at computers accidentally. Most likely, the sender did 
not intend that the message be "used" by the recipient public 
body. Thus, it is by no means clear that all e-mail messages 
would qualify as "public records" if they were sent to the 
agency, were not intended to be used in any way bythe agency, 
and if they were never saved by the agency's e-mail system. 
The· second prong of this test, that a record be used "in the 
performance of an official function,"74 is not defined in the 
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
73. Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ., 327 N.W.2d 783, 784, 792 (Mich. 1982) 
(noting that "[t]he magnetic tape is undisputably 'prepared, owned, used, in the 
possession of, or retained by' the defendant public body") (Ryan, J., opinion for rever-
sal). The three justices who voted to affirm the Michigan Court of Appeals ruling did 
not address each prong of the public record test separately. Rather, they decided only 
that "(a] list of students appears to be a public record, i.e., 'a writing prepared, owned, 
used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the performance of an 
official function, from the time it is created.'" Id. at 785 (Fitzgerald, J., opinion for 
affirmance). 
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(c). 
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statute. In their opinion for reversal, three justices in Kesten-
baum maintained that this expression should be "construed ac-
cording to its commonly accepted and generally understood 
meaning."75 The court as a whole affirmed the holding that 
Michigan State University's computer tapes passed this part 
of the test. 76 Yet, because these holdings resulted from an affir-
mance by an equally divided court, it is difficult to predict how 
a full seven-member court would rule when the issue of e-mail 
and the FOIA arises. 
When the Michigan Supreme Court turns its attention to this 
matter in the future, it will probably review the broad array 
of Michigan court decisions which have considered the defi-
nition of a "public record." For example, the Michigan Court of 
Appeals has held that mug shots,77 disciplinary worksheets for 
prisoners,78 salary records of university teachers,79 and closed 
meetings held by the Detroit City Counci180 all fall within the 
spectrum of public records under the FOIA. Moreover, the 
Michigan Supreme Court may consider its decision to label 
autopsy reports prepared by the county coroner as "public 
records."81 
c. Federal Application of the FOIA-The federal rules defin-
ing "records" are as equally vague as their Michigan counter-
parts. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
has commented that, "[a]s has often been remarked, the 
Freedom of Information Act, for all its attention to the treat-
ment of 'agency records,' never defines that crucial phrase."82 
The Supreme Court has held generally that 
75. Kestenbaum, 327 N.W.2d at 792. 
76. Id. ("Facilitating communications among students, preventing a great deal 
of havoc, and simply operating the university in an efficient manner are all 'official 
functions' of Michigan State University."). 
77. Patterson v. Allegan County Sheriff, 502 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993). 
78. Favors v. Department of Corrections, 480 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1991). Note that the court held that these worksheets were public records even though 
they normally were destroyed after the warden made his decision. Id. This suggests 
that the court may not find persuasive the argument that some e-mail which is 
quickly disposed should not be considered public record. 
79. Penokie v. Michigan Technological Univ., 287 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1979). 
80. Detroit News, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 460 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1990). 
81. Swickard v. Wayne County Medical Examiner, 475 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Mich. 
1991). 
82. McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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[a]lthough Congress has supplied no definition of agency 
records in the FOIA, it has formulated a definition in other 
Acts. The Records Disposal A~t [herein the Federal Records 
Act], in effect at the time Congress enacted the Freedom of 
Information Act, provides the following threshold require-
ment for agency records: "'records' includes all books, 
papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or 
other documentary materials, regardless of physical form 
or characteristics made or received by an agency of the 
United States Government under Federal law or in connec-
tion with the transaction of public business .... "83 
According to one treatise, "[a]gency regulations and court 
decisions are in accord with this type of expansive, all en-
compassing definition of records."84 As mentioned earlier, 
federal courts have placed computer documents within this 
definition,85 in addition to magazine photographs,86 union 
authorization cards,87 x-rays,88 computerized mailing lists,89 
tape recordings,90 and films.91 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
applied the nexus test in Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. v. 
United States Department of Justice92 to determine whether a 
document is a record. "[W]e looked to see if there was 'some 
"nexus" between the agency and the documents other than the 
mere incidence oflocation.' "93 The court relied upon an Illinois 
district court opinion which emphasized that the mere posses-
sion of a record by an agency was not enough to make it a 
departmental record.94 The court noted that the "use of the 
documents by employees other than the author [was] an 
83. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 183 (1980) (citing 44 U.S.C. § 3301). 
84. See 1 BRAVERMAN & CHETWYND, supra note 44, at 129. 
85. Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 678 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
86. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
87. Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1977). 
88. Nichols v. United States, 460 F.2d 671, 673 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 
966 (1972). 
89. Disabled Officer's Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D.D.C. 1977). 
90. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 406 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
91. Save the Dolphins v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407, 411 
(N.D. Cal. 1975). 
92. 742 F.2d 1484, 1493 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
93. Id. at 1491 (quoting Wolfe v. United States Dep't of Health and Human 
Servs., 711 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C: Cir. 1983)). 
94. Id. (citing Illinois Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. v. United States Dep't of 
Labor, 545 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). 
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important consideration."95 But the court was not persuaded 
that how an agency treated a document for disposal purposes 
was a relevant consideration, maintaining instead that "an 
agency should not be able to alter its disposal regulations to 
avoid the requirements of FOIA."96 
In determining whether a document is a record, the federal 
courts have considered whether the document (1) was gener-
ated within the agency; (2) has been placed into the agency's 
files; (3) is in the agency's control; and (4) has been used by the 
agency for an agency purpose. 97 Applying these factors, the 
court in Bureau of National Affairs held that "yellow telephone 
message slips" kept for short periods of time by an Office of 
Management and Budget official were "not 'agency records' 
within the meaning of FOIA" because "[n]o substantive infor-
mation [was] contained in them."98 The court also held, howev-
er, that "daily agendas" maintained by the secretary for the 
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust were agency records 
because "[t]hey were created for the express purpose of facili-
tating the daily activities of the Antitrust Division."99 Finally, 
the court concluded that the official's appointment calendars 
were not agency records because "they were not distributed to 
other employees" but were expressly for the official's personal 
convenience. 100 
Following the logic in Bureau of National Affairs, the record 
status of e-mail would vary message-by-message. Many mes-
sages are created solely for "personal convenience," while other 
messages contain calendars and appointment schedules which 
allow department heads to schedule meetings via the computer. 
Some e-mail messages are circulated throughout an entire 
department, while others are meant for only one other person. 
It is clear, however, that e-mail is more than just a scratch pad 
for personal use, because almost all e-mail messages are 
created in order to communicate with someone else. The 
applicability of Michigan's FOIA to electronic mail remains 
uncertain largely because of uncertainty regarding whether all 
95. Id. at 1493. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 1494-95. 
98. Id. at 1495. These slips of paper contained "the name of the caller, the date 
· and time of the call and, possibly, a telephone number .... The slips d[id] not indicate 
why the call was made and, most importantly, whether the call was personal or 
related to official agency business." Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1496. 
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or some e-mail messages are used "in the performance of an 
official function."101 Moreover, it would be technically difficult 
to have a person or program sort through every government e-
mail message to decide which messages equalled a public 
record and which messages simply were too informal to have 
an official function. 
d. Do Any Exemptions to the FOIA Apply to E-mail?-
i. Section 243(a): Information of a Personal Nature-The Michi-
gan FOIA "separates public records into 2 classes: (i) those 
which· are exempt from disclosure under section 13, and (ii) all 
others, which are subject to disclosure."102 Section -13 of the 
Michigan FOIA 103 lists the only exemptions applicable to FOIA 
requests. The first exemption might apply to various electronic 
messages on a case-by-case basis: "A public body may exempt 
from disclosure as a public· record under this act: (a) Informa-
tion of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the 
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of an individual's privacy."104 This exemption, like the twenty 
others, is "to be narrowly construed."105 The Michigan courts 
have applied common law principles and constitutional lan-
guage to aid them in this grey area of privacy law. Justice 
Cavanagh has reasoned: 
The Legislature made no attempt to define the right of 
privacy. We are left to apply the principles of privacy 
developed under the common law and our constitution. The 
contours and limits are thus to be determined by the court, 
as the trier of fact, on a case-by-case basis in the tradition 
of the common law. Such an approach permits, and indeed 
requires, scrutiny of the particular facts of each· case, to 
identify those in which ordinarily impersonal information 
takes on 'an intensely personal character' justifying nondis-
closure under the privacy exemption.106 
101. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. § 15.243 (West 1994). 
104. Id.§ 243(l)(a). 
105. Swickard v. Wayne County Medical Examiner, 475 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 
1991). 
106. State Employees Ass'n v. Department of Management & Budget, 404 N.W.2d 
606, 614-15 (Mich. 1987) (footnotes omitted). 
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In an earlier case, three justices of the Michigan Supreme 
Court stated that "names and addresses of students enrolled 
at Michigan State University are not 'information of a personal 
nature.' "107 Justice Ryan's opinion reasoned that "[m]ost 
citizens voluntarily divulge their names and addresses on such 
a widespread basis that any alleged privacy interest in the 
information is either absent or waived."108 
Generally, Michigan courts have kept to a narrow interpre-
tation of records which would qualify for the privacy exception. 
Swickard v. Wayne County Medical Examiner109 provides a good 
example. The case involved the suicide death of the Honorable 
Judge Quinn, Jr. 110 Based on information learned from the 
police, the newspaper suspected that the judge had used drugs 
prior to the incident. 111 The newspaper requested the deceased 
judge's autopsy and toxicology test results under the FOIA. 112 
The standard used by the court was "whether the invasion [of 
privacy] would be 'clearly unwarranted.' "113 The court, follow-
ing a federal court's rule that held that privacy rights belong 
to an individual and perish with that individual, 114 held that 
disclosure of the autopsy results and the toxicology tests 
"would not amount to a 'clearly unwarranted invasion of 
privacy' of the late Judge Quinn or his family."115 
Applying the rigors of the privacy exception to the variety of 
electronic messages will be difficult. First, each electronic 
message would have to be defended from disclosure on a case-
by-case basis, which could prove to be time consuming.116 There 
is the option of in camera review, but again, the number of 
messages sent per day by an agency would probably make this 
option prohibitively time consuming. As for the content of 
107. Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ., 327 N.W.2d 783, 798 (Mich. 1982) 
(Ryan, J., opinion for reversal). 
108. Id. at 795. 
109. 475 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1991). 
110. Id. at 306. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 309 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(1)(a) (West 1994)). 
114. Id. at 313 (citing Diamond v. FBI, 532 F. Supp. 216, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
115. Id. at 315; see also Penokie v. Michigan Technological Univ., 287 N.W.2d 304, 
310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that disclosure of university employee salary 
information might occasion a "minor invasion" of privacy but that it was "outweighed 
by the public's right to know precisely how its tax dollars are spent"). 
116. See Penokie, 287 N.W.2d at 308 (requiring that "the government agency bearO 
the burden of establishing that denial of a request for disclosure is statutorily sup-
ported"). 
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e-mail, the state agencies have a policy of using their com-
puters only for official business. This suggests that most e-mail 
used by an agency would not qualify for the exception for 
records containing "intimate details" of a "highly personal 
nature." Universities, however, have no such policy for using 
their systems, although they do ask that their systems be used 
to further research. The reality of both situations is that 
personal information probably is transmitted every day by 
public employees. Many people treat e-mail like a telephone 
and assume that it is private to some degree, regardless of 
departmental policy. Some messages probably would pass the 
"clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy test, but the task of 
reviewing all such messages and defending them in court could 
prove expensive. 
The comparable federal exemption (Exemption (6)) is not 
identical to section 243(a) of the Michigan statute. The lan-
guage, "personnel and medical files and similar files the 
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy,"117 is not the same as "[i]nfor-
mation of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the 
information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion 
of an individual's privacy."118 The following issues have been 
identified as falling within the federal privacy exemption: 
"marital status, legitimacy of children, identity of children's fa-
thers, medical condition, welfare status, alcohol consumption, 
family fights, reputation, personal job preferences and goals, 
job evaluations, job promotion prospects, [and] reasons for 
employment termination. "119 
A key federal case, Department of the Air Force v. Rose,120 
held that Air Force cadet discipline records were not protected 
from disclosure by Exemption (6). 121 The United States 
Supreme Court found "nothing in the wording of Exemption 6 
or its legislative history to support the Agency's claim that 
Congress created a blanket exemption for personnel files .... 
[NJo reason would exist for nondisclosure in the absence of a 
showing of a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy."122 In 
Rose, the Court was worried that agencies simply would place 
117. 5 u.s.c. § 552(b)(6) (1994). 
118. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(l)(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added). 
119. Penokie, 287 N.W.2d at 308. 
120. 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 
121. Id. at 370. 
122. Id. at 371. 
998 University of Michigan Journal of Law Ileform [VOL. 28:4 
sensitive records into files labeled "personnel" and render them 
exempt. The Court ruled that Congress intended to "construct 
an exemption that would require a balancing Of the individual's 
right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose 
of the Freedom oflnformation Act 'to open agency action to the 
light of public. scrutiny.' "123 The Court concluded that informa-
tion could be redacted if necessary. The Court quoted the 
Senate Report: "'[W]here files are involved [courts will] have 
to examine the records themselves and require disclosure of 
portions to which the purposes of the exemption under which 
they are withheld does not apply.'"124 
Again, federal case law reaffirms the stance taken by Mich-
igan courts that any and all records are subject to disclosure, 
unless disclosure would constitute a "clearly unwarranted 
invasion" of privacy. The United States Supreme Court has em-
phasized that when an agency attempts to exempt an entire 
group of records or files, it violates the intent of Congress 
underlying the FOIA.125 This suggests that an agency or 
university decision to treat all electronic mail as exempt for 
privacy reasons would fail. A Michigan court interpreting Rose 
likely would find that each e-mail message should be subject 
to inspection to determine whether it should be released or 
protected as private. 126 
ii. Section 243(1)(n): Communications Within a Public 
Body-There is another exemption which could apply to e-mail 
messages on a case-by-case basis. The Michigan FOIA provides: 
(1) A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public 
record under this act: 
(n) Communications and notes within a public body or 
between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent 
that they cover other than purely factual materials and are 
preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or 
action. This exemption does not apply unless the public 
body shows that in the particular instance the public 
interest in encouraging frank communications between 
123. Id. at 372. 
124. Id. at 374 (quoting S. REP. No. 854, supra note 39, at 32). 
125. Id. at 370-77. 
126. See id. at 374. 
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officials and employees of public bodies dearly outweighs 
the public interest in disclosure .... 127 
This exemption, Exemption (n), has been interpreted by 
Michigan courts on at least two occasions. In DeMaria Build-
ing. Co. u. Department of Management and Budget, 128 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals was presented with a case in which 
the plaintiff sought an outside consultant's report to the De-
partment of Management and Budget concerning cost overruns 
on a university construction site.129 The Michigan Attorney 
General denied the request for the consultant's report, citing 
exemption 243(1)(n). 130 In a brief opinion, the court focused on 
the language "between public bodies" and ruled that an outside 
consultant was not a public body within the meaning of section 
15.232(b).131 Thus the exemption did not apply.132 According to 
the court, there were "strong public policy arguments as to why 
the reports of independent consultants to a public body should 
be accorded the same status as reports generated within the 
public body itself."133 However, the court could not ignore the 
Michigan Supreme Court's past decisions to "narrowly construe 
the exemption provisions of the act."134 
In another Michigan case, Favors u. Department of Cor-
rections, 135 the appellate court held that worksheets used by 
the Department of Corrections to make disciplinary credit 
decisions were preliminary to a final agency determination of 
policy because they covered only the committee's recommen-
dations.136 The warden made all of the final decisions regarding 
changes in inmate incarceration. 137 The court explained that 
"[t]he comment sheet is designed to allow the committee 
members to state their candid impressions regarding the 
inmate's eligibility for disciplinary credits. Release of this 
information conceivably could discourage frank appraisals by 
the committee and, thus, inhibit accurate assessment of an 
127. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 5.243(1)(n) (West 1994). 
128. · 407 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
129. Id. at 72. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 73-74. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 73. 
134. Id. 
135. 480 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). 
136. Id. at 606. 
137. Id. 
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inmate's merit or lack thereof."138 Next the court weighed the 
public interest in encouraging frank communications against 
the public interest in disclosure of the worksheet, concluding 
that "[t]he public has a far greater interest in insuring that 
these evaluations are accurate than in knowing the reasons 
behind the evaluations."139 
Electronic mail messages may qualify for exemption 243(1)(n) 
if (1) they were sent within or between two public agencies; (2) 
they were preliminary to a final action or decision; and (3) the 
need for frank communication in the particular instance out-
weighs the public interest.140 The third prong applies. most 
directly to e-mail. If one were to try to exempt e-mail as a 
whole, this code section would be the place to start. One advan-
tage of e-mail is that it promotes frank discussion and the 
quick, efficient exchange of ideas in a relatively simple format. 
Whether this need for frank discussion outweighs the public 
interest remains unclear. · 
As for the second prong, e-mail can be used to convey a final 
decision or action, but this is probably rare. It would be unusu-
al, for example, to have the warden write his final decision on 
e-mail, but it would not be unusual to have the board members 
make their personal recommendations via e-mail. In this 
regard, e-mail is most like the worksheet because much of what 
is communicated on e-mail is likely to be candid and impres-
sionistic rather than final or formal. 
Finally, the applicability of the first prong of the test would 
vary by message. Following DeMaria Building, e-mail messages 
which were not created by a public body would not be subject 
to this exemption. It is not clear, however, how this might 
apply to e-mail in some situations. For example, consider the 
case in which a message is sent from a consultant to an agency, 
and then that agency forwards the same message to another 
agency. The message probably has now beco.me a communi-
cation "within or between" public bodies. The language of the 
statute says nothing about the notes originating with the 
public agency, but the Michigan Court of Appeals did interpret 
the exemption in this way in DeMaria Building. 141 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 607. 
140. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.243(1)(n) (West 1994). 
141. See DeMaria Bldg. Co. v. Department of Management and Budget, 407 N. W.2d 
72, 73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
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e. Are E-mail Messages Sent to or Received from a Private 
Party by a Public Agency Subject to the FOIA?-Whether e-mail 
messages to or from a public agency are ·subject to the FOIA 
depends on the definition of "public record" under the FOIA. 142 
The Act defines a public record as "a writing prepared, owned, 
used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the 
performance of an official function, from the time it is creat-
ed."143 
The most relevant case interpreting this language as it ap-
plies to messages sent to or received from a private party is 
Walloon Lake Water Systems, Inc. v. Melrose Township. 144 In 
that case, an individual citizen sent a letter to a township 
regarding the water system provided by plaintiff's company.145 
The letter was read aloud at a regularly scheduled town meet-
ing and recorded in the minutes of the meeting.146 When the 
plaintiff requested the letter from the defendant-township, 
pursuant to the FOIA, the township supervisor refused to 
release the letter.147 The court was cautious in its ruling: 
Without opining as to what extent an outside communi-
cation to an agency constitutes a public record, we believe 
that here, once the letter was read aloud and incorporated 
into the minutes of the meeting where the township con-
ducted its business, it became a public record "used ... in 
the performance of an official function."148 
No other cases extend or clarify this ruling. 149 
Thus, it remains unclear to what extent private communica-
tions, which are not "used" in a formal manner by the gov-
ernment, can be disclosed under the FOIA. The federal law on 
this point, as discussed above, is very confusing. Apparently, 
142. See supra Part 11.A.3.b. 
143. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
144. 415 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). 
145. Id. at 294. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. DeMaria Building Co. v. Department of Management, 407 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1987) suggests that a consultant's report, paid for and in the possession of 
the government, is disclosable under the FOIA. The record status of the report in 
DeMaria Building was neither discussed nor disputed and the court gi-anted disclo· 
sure. Id. at 72-73. A consultant's report, however, is a far cry from an unrequested 
e-mail message sent by a citizen to a public agency which is then filed by the agency 
server. 
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some nexus must exist between a document and its use by an 
agency before it becomes a public record belonging to that 
department. The key case in this area is Kissinger v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press. 150 The United States Su-
preme Court in Reporters Committee was presented with the 
issue of when a document "in the possession" of a party not an 
agency becomes an "agency record,"151 where earlier FOIA cases 
had dealt with the problem of when a record created elsewhere 
but later transferred to a FOIA agency becomes a record. 152 The 
Court held that possession or control by the agency is a prereq-
uisite to FOIA disclosure. 153 
It is unclear whether e-mail messages sent by private citi-
zens to public agencies are covered by the FOIA. Federal law 
is not on point and might not even control because the lan-
guage of the Michigan statute regarding a "public record" is so 
broad. Parts of the Michigan FOIA definition are left unde-
fined. For example, the phrase, "from the time it is created,"154 
is not addre·ssed in any decision. One possible conclusion is 
that a private-party document is not a record as long as the 
state agency or university only receives it and does not "use" 
it. In Kestenbaum v. Michigan State University, three justices 
stated that Michigan State University's student list was a 
record because the school had to "use" the list officially.155 
However, an e-mail message from a private citizen to the 
Department of Management and Budget regarding how tax 
dollars are spent may not be a record. Moreover, even if all 
private correspondence are records under the FOIA, they may 
be so unimportant in documenting agency activity that they do 
not need to be saved or retained under the Management and 
Budget Act. 156 
150. 445 U.S. 136 (1980). 
151. Id. at 139. 
152. See, e.g., Lykins v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (holding that pre-sentence reports which have been turned over to the Parole 
Commission are "agency records" even though they originated in the courts, which 
are not FOIA agencies); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (setting 
forth standard for determining "[w]hether a congressionally generated document has 
become an agency record"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). 
153. Reporters Committee, 445 U.S. at 155. 
154. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
155. Kestenbaum v. Michigan State Univ., 327 N.W.2d 783, 792 (Mich. 1982) 
(Ryan, J., opinion for reversal). 
156. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 18.1284-.1292 (West 1994). 
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B. The Management and Budget Act 
The FOIA describes which records must be disclosed to the 
public upon proper request. It does not, however, require the 
State to create or maintain any records. 157 These duties are 
contained in the Management and Budget Act (MBA), which 
provides: 
(1) The head of each state agency shall maintain records 
which are necessary for all of the following: 
(a) The continued effective operation of the state agency. 
(b) An adequate and proper recording of the activities of the 
state agency. 
(c) The protection of the legal rights of the state. 
(2) The head of a state agency maintaining any record shall 
cause the records to be listed on a retention and disposal 
schedule. 158 
Moreover, the MBA mandates that the Department of Manage-
ment and Budget "[p]romote the establishment of a vital re-
cords program in each state agency by assisting in identifying 
and preserving records considered to be critically essential to 
the continued operation of state government or necessary to the 
protection of the rights and privileges ofits citizens, or both."159 
The Michigan Secretary of State has a duty to determine 
which records possess "archival value" and should not be des-
troyed.160 Records with "archival value" are defined as 
records which have been selected by the archives section 
of the bureau of history in the department of state as 
having enduring worth because they document the growth 
and development of this state from earlier times, including 
the territorial period; they evidence the creation, organiza-
tion, development, operation, functions, or effects of state 
agencies; or because they contain significant information 
157. See id. § 15.233(3). 
158. Id. § 18.1285(1)-(2). 
159. Id. § 18.1287(c). 
160. Id. § 18.1289. 
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about persons, things, problems, or conditions dealt with 
by state agencies.161 
The definition of a "record" in the MBA is slightly different 
than under the FOIA.162 The MBA definition includes "mag-
netic or paper tape, microform, magnetic or punch card, disc, 
drum, sound or video recording, electronic data processing 
material, or other recording medium, and includes individual 
letters, words, pictures, sounds, impulses, or symbols, or 
combination thereof, regardless of physical form or characteiis-
tics."163 
Moreover, the MBA defines a "state agency" differently than 
the FOIA defines a "public body."164 Under the MBA a "state 
agency" means "a department, board, commission, office, agen-
cy, authority, or other unit of state government." However, it 
does not include "an institution of higher education or a com-
munity college."165 
It is not clear how the MBA and the FOIA apply to electronic 
mail. The MBA seems to have a broader definition of"record." 
E-mail, in some sense, is "electronic data processing material" 
because it is the manipulation of electronic data, and much e-
mail can be created with an ordinary data processing program 
such as Microsoft Word or WordPerfect. E-mail, however, is 
broader than mere data processing; it is also a form of commu-
nication. 166 
That neither the FOIA nor the MBA refers to e-mail explicit-
ly could be problematic because it is such a unique medium. 
E-mail is something less than a traditional writing. A message 
can take the shape of a "letter" only if the receiver or sender 
chooses to print the message, and much e-mail is never print-
ed. Moreover, because a high volume of messages are sent 
daily, they resemble phone calls rather than documents. 
Interestingly, telephone calls are not mentioned in either act. 
It can only be assumed that phone calls are not records. 
161. Id. § 18.1284(a). 
162. Compare id. § 18.1284(b) (West 1994) with id. § 15.232(c) (West 1994 & Supp. 
1995). 
163. Id. § 18.1284(b). 
164. Compare id. § 18.1115(5) (West 1994) with id. § 15.232(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 
1995). 
165. Id. § 18.1115(5). 
166. Moreover, all e-mail is likely to be stored either on a magnetic tape or hard 
drive, unlike a phone call, which often is not stored at all. 
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Even if e-mail is considered a record by either definition, it 
is not clear that all e-mail is of "archival value."167 Some e-
mail contains schedules and employee calendars which record 
day-to-day activity. E-mail is also a popular means of ex-
changing ideas, but e-mail rarely consists of "final drafts" of 
documents. The government is far from seeing the day of the 
paperless office. Also, many e-mail software packages are 
poor word processors and thus not very helpful for creating 
anything more than short, unformatted messages. E-mail has 
the potential to revolutionize the way in which society works 
with documents and reports of significant length, although 
its current use is for only very brief memoranda or "typed" 
telephone calls. 
C. Federal Court Interpretation of the Federal Records Act: 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President 
A federal court has recently interpreted the Federal Re-
cords Act, which is comparable to Michigan's Management 
and Budget Act. In Armstrong v. Executive Office of the 
President, 168 the court ruled that "electronic communications 
systems can create, and have created, documents that con-
stitute federal records under the [Federal Records Act]."169 
Armstrong began when a private organization made a FOIA 
request for certain e-mail created during the Reagan admin-
istration.170 When the National Archive failed to provide the 
requested computer tapes, a lower court found the National 
Archive to be in contempt of court and fined it $50,000 per 
day. 171 The lower court decided the issues presented under 
the Federal Records Act (FRA), rather than under the Feder-
al FOIA.172 
167. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.1289(1). The Secretary of State deter-
mines whether a record possesses archival value. Id. 
168. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
169. Id. at 1282. 
170. Id. at 1280. 
171. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 821 F. Supp. 761, 764 
(D.D.C. 1993). 
172. Id. at 763. It is unclear why the court sidestepped an interpretation of the 
federal FOIA and instead chose to interpret the case under the Federal Records Act. 
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For the· purposes of the Federal Records Act, "records" are 
defined as 
all books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable 
[i.e., electronic] materials, or other documentary materi-
als, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made 
or received by an agency of the United States Govern-
ment under Federal law or in connection with the trans-
action of public business and preserved or appropriate for 
preservation by that agency.173 
At oral argument, the government agreed with the court of 
appeals that "this [e-mail] system has, in the past, created 
some things that qualify as federal records."174 
The Armstrong court ruled that printing messages onto 
paper and storing only the "papered version" was not the 
equivalent of saving e-mail in its electronic form because 
"important information present in the e-mail system, such as 
who sent a document, who received it, and when that person 
received it, will not always appear on the computer screen 
and so will not be preserved on the paper print-out."175 The 
Armstrong court also decided that electronic directories and 
distribution lists which often accompany e-mail would be 
"appropriate for preservation" in these sifaations.176 The 
court found that although the agency heads had "some discre-
tion" in determining what constitutes a record, they did not 
have the power to declare "'inappropriate for preservation' an 
entire set of substantive e-mail documents generated by two 
[Presidential] administrations over a seven-year period."177 As 
a result of Armstrong, the National Archives and Records 
Administration revised the federal rule on electronic records 
management to incorporate the standards for e-mail, with the 
goal of placing e-mail in context with the management of 
records in all media. 178 
The Federal Records Act definition of "record" is very close 
to the two definitions found in the Michigan Code. For 
173. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1278 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 3301). 
174. Id. at 1283 n.6. 
175. Id. at 1284. 
176. Id. at 1284 n.8. 
177. Id. at 1283. 
178. See 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 1220, 1222, 
1228, 1234). 
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example, both the Federal Records Act and the Michigan 
Management and Budget Act define a "record" as material 
"regardless of physical form or characteristics."179 This 
language persuaded the Armstrong court that "substantive 
communications otherwise meeting the definition of federal 
'records' that had been saved on the electronic mail came 
within the FRA's purview."180 The federal government has yet 
to test the Federal Freedom of Information Act as it applies to 
e-mail. 181 
D. Michigan Rules of Discovery 
Michigan Court Rules permit the discovery of 
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates 
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or. to 
the claim or defense of another party, including the exis-
tence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location 
of books, documents, or other tangible things. 182 
The Michigan Court Rules further illustrate how this rule 
works. "A party may serve on another person a request ... to 
inspect and copy designated documents or to inspect and copy, 
test, or sample tangible things."183 This rule defines "docu-
ments" as "writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, 
phonorecords, and other data compilations from which 
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the 
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable 
form."184 
There are no published opinions on the subject of discovering 
e-mail in non-criminal cases; however, one practice guide 
recommends that lawyers clearly define the term "documents" 
179. See Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1280; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 18.1284(b). 
180. Armstrong, 1 F.3d at 1280-81. 
181. A bill was introduced last year in the United States Congress to amend the 
Federal Freedom of Information Act to require agencies, when requested, to make 
information, including electronic formats, available to the public "in any form or 
format in which such records are maintained by that agency." See H.R. 4917, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). This bill was never passed. 
182. MICH. CT. R. PRAC. 2.302(B). 
183. MICH. CT. R. PRAC. 2.310. 
184. Id. 
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in their interrogatories. 185 The . sample forms in this guide 
define "documents" as "all tangible material, of whatever na-
ture, including, but not limited to, all written material such as 
graphs, charts, maps, drawings, correspondence, memoranda, 
records, notes, manuals, books, photographs, X rays, and all 
information stored on computer and/or archived software 
capable of reduction to a written document."186 E-mail already 
has been admitted into evidence in several reported Michigan 
cases, but none of these have included an electronic message 
sent by a public employee.187 
California attorneys regularly seek discovery of e-mail 
records. A recently published article in The American Lawyer 
describes the increasing number of civil cases that entail 
searching e-mail messages. 188 According to the article, the au-
thor learned that "[d]iscovery requests for e-mail and other 
computer-stored information are becoming more routine ... 
given the 'ton of information out there that doesn't exist on pa-
per."'189 One lawyer noted the increased popularity of e-mail 
in Silicon Valley: "[T]hey don't pick up the phone, they don't 
talk in the hallway .... They send e-mail."190 This trend has 
led lawyers to craft their discovery requests much more specifi-
cally; some requests even call for hidden and deleted e-mail 
files. 191 In fact, a cottage industry has formed in California to 
search e-mail files for law firms. 192 One of these new high-tech 
discovery firms searched 750,000 e-mail messages to find 7000 
"potentially relevant" messages in one company's database. 193 
The provision in the Michigan Court Rules Practice that de-
fines "documents" includes "other data compilations from which 
information can be obtained."194 This language seems broad 
enough to include e-mail, and the future undoubtedly will find 
the Michigan government faced with litigation that includes 
185. BRUCE T. WALLACE & MARY R. MINNET, DISCOVERY PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR 
MICHIGAN LAWYERS 256 (1986). 
186. Id. at 264-78. 
187. See, e.g., Donley v. Ameritech Servs., No. 92-72236, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21281 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1992) (concerning an employee fired after sending an 
electronic message to another employee concerning a client). 
188. Vera Titunik, Collecting Evidence in the Age of E-mail, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 
1994, at 119, 119. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. MICH. CT. R. PRAc. 2.310(A). 
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highly specific discovery requests asking for e-mail files, 
perhaps even deleted ones. If an electronic message is "rele-
vant" to the litigation, it appears that lawyers will go to great 
lengths to obtain it. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
At one extreme, one could advocate extending to e-mail the 
same privacy protections and confidentiality that currently 
apply to telephone conversations, protections which are 
currently enjoyed not only by private citizens but also by em-
ployees of public agencies. 195 At the other extreme, one could 
advocate that the FOIA and records preservation laws should 
apply to e-mail in the same way they apply to traditional 
written communications to and from public employees. 196 The 
latter position would ensure widespread public access to e-mail 
and would require preservation of e-mail under limited circum-
stances. 
Given that electronic mail is a communications medium that 
has come to serve many of the functions of both telephone 
conversations and written communications, these two different 
positions are reasonable. Before e".'mail, the law in Michigan, 
as in the nation, had crystallized around a set of expectations 
that public employees' telephone conversations would be 
private and that written communications would be public, 
except in precisely limited circumstances. There are significant 
advantages to meeting these expectations. Public employees, 
like private individuals, need a sphere in which they can talk, 
deliberate, and formulate their ideas without fear of constant 
surveillance; yet at the same time, members of the public need 
to have access to information about what their government is 
doing. The law has promoted both policies by encouraging 
public employees to use telephone communication for discus-
sions which they wish to keep private and requiring that their 
written communications be preserved and disclosed in most 
circumstances. 
195. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994) (federal wiretap statute); MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 750.539 (West 1994) (Michigan's wiretap statute). 
196. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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E-mail has upset the traditional understanding of privacy. 
It is a flexible medium which may well absorb most commu-
nication which previously occurred in both telephonic and 
wr.itten form. In this new medium, how can society protect both 
the privacy traditionally accorded telephone calls and the 
public's right of access to information ·as embodied in our 
disclosure statutes? · 
A threshold question must be addressed: Should e-mail be 
used for the sorts of candid conversations which have previ-
ously taken place as telephone conversations among public 
employees and between public employees and citizens? I 
believe that this is desirable. Few technological innovations 
have greater potential than e-mail to make public officials 
more accessible to each other and to the general public. The 
rapid and easy exchange ofinformation among individuals who 
are widely dispersed in the hierarchy of government and in 
geographic location and whose schedules make telephone 
communication difficult can be expected to improve under-
standing and the quality of decision making in public life. The 
blanket disclosure of electronic messages to the public would 
discourage some desirable communications among public 
employees. If e-mail is to be regulated and disclosed under the 
same terms as public pronouncements of state agencies, a 
significant fraction of the communication now occurring elec-
tronically will shift back to the telephone or, more troubling, 
simply not occur. 
So what should be done? The prior analysis of Michigan 
statutes indicates that there are some significant ambiguities 
both in applying the FOIA and in applying the Management 
and Budget Act to e-mail. Nevertheless, the text of the statutes 
and the decisions interpreting the text do suggest that all e-
mail messages most likely will be "writings" within the mean-
ing of the FOIA and that many, if not most, will be "public 
records" subject to disclosure under the FOIA unless the 
agency or public employee can show that a particular message 
was created for personal convenience. This will subject the 
electronic messages of state agencies and universities to the 
requirements of disclosure unless they can meet the heavy 
burden of showing that one of the FOIA exemptions applies. 
Arguably, the most relevant exemption is Exemption (n), 
which excludes from disclosure "[c]ommunications and notes 
within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory 
nature to the extent that they cover other than purely factual 
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materials and are preliminary to a final agency determina-
tion of policy or·action."197 This exemption, however, requires . 
case-by-case adjudication concerning each communication. 198 
In practice, this exemption does little to protect e-mail from 
disclosure, because it would be difficult and expensive to de-
fend from disclosure each of the thousands of messages on a 
case-by-case basis. More important, a public employee can 
never be certain when sending a message that Exemption (n) 
will protect the message from future disclosure. This uncer-
tainty could deter public employees from risking electronic 
communication in the fir.st place. 
Removing electronic communications entirely from the FOIA 
most assuredly would maximize the privacy. of. e-mail and 
encourage.its widespread use among public employees. It also 
would permit, however, significant erosion of the. disclosure· 
currently provided under the FOIA; as communications that 
were once written may gradually shift to electronic forms. The . 
disclosure currently. required under the FOIA may be so 
burdensome and intrusive that a broad reform of the definition 
of the "writings" subject to disclosure is in order. 199 
A more limited solution to the public disclosure of e-mail 
under the FOIA would be to amend Exemption (n) so as to 
provide a safe harbor fo:r that subset of electronic messages 
which most closely resembles the informal exchange of ideas 
and information that occurs on the telephone. The current 
exemption requires a case-by-case balancing of public interest 
in disclosure agairist the need for frank communication; a 
revision could confer a blanket exemption on "consultative" e.-
mail conferences among public employees. Such an exemption 
would require a careful definition of the types of messages that 
would be permitted on the consultative conference, as well as 
an enforcement mechanism to ensure that. employees do not 
use the conference as a way to shield unqualified messages 
from public scrutiny. 
It also seems clear that there exist whole classes of e-mail 
users at public institutions who should enjoy exemption from 
the FOIA. Among these are students at educational 
197. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 15.243(1)(n) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). 
198. See id. ("This exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that 
in the particular instance the public interest in encouraging frank communications 
between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public 
interest in disclosure."). 
199. See Cole Letter, supra note 42, at 85-89. 
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institutions, both high schools and universities, who commu-
nicate with each other and with their teachers concerning 
matters related to their instruction. 
Federal case law and statutes, which employ a slightly 
different definition of "record," have been extended to e-mail, 
and have caused the National Archives and Records 
Adminstration to promulgate an e-mail preservation regime. 200 
The National Archives and Records Administration recently 
has revised the regulations relating to records management to 
include e-mail in the general requirements for records in all 
media. 201 The standards for recordkeeping requirements now 
indicate that e-mail messages may be considered records. 202 
The regulations relating specifically to electronic records 
management define an electronic mail message as any "docu-
ment created or received on an electronic mail system including 
brief notes, more formal or substantive narrative documents, 
and any attachments, such as word processing and other 
electronic documents, which may be transmitted with the 
message."203 
Michigan may wish to refine its definition of e-mail "records" 
which are to be preserved and, by tying this definition to the 
FOIA, which are to be disclosed. It may wish to require the 
State Archivist or some other appropriate state agency to 
develop guidelines more tailored to conditions in Michigan for 
how messages are designated as records and how messages can 
be generated with relative confidence that they will not be 
disclosed. 
CONCLUSION 
Society is now faced with the ever-widening set of legal 
issues posed by evolving electronic communications. Electronic 
mail is but one of a broad array of technologies which Michigan 
and other states must soon mesh with their public disclosure 
laws. Voicemail, facsimile transmissions, and computer confer-
ences each have implications, not just for public disclosure laws 
200. 36 C.F.R. § 1234 (1994). 
201. See 60 Fed. Reg. 44,634 (1995) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 1220, 1222, 1228, 
1234). 
202. Id. at 44,640 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 1222.34(e)). 
203. Id. at 44,641 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 1234.2). 
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but also for laws protecting against eavesdropping, for laws 
concerning harassment and stalking, and for the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. This Note suggests 
balancing the needs of the public to be informed of governmen-
tal activities and decisions with the feasibility of providing a 
technically workable solution given the amount of e-mail which 
will soon exist. Given that achieving a perfect balance is not 
possible, lawmakers should err on the side of disclosure, 
because both the Michigan FOIA and the Federal FOIA were 
drafted for the purpose of maintaining the public's trust in its 
government. For this trust to endure, the government must 
remain open to its constituents. 

